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18 May 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Planning Examples

1. NE Division

In the '66 program the Division paints a picture of expanding Soviet operations in the Middle East with a corresponding slippage of the U.S. position throughout the area. There is a tone of inevitability about this. Iraq is written off as inevitably going communist. The Division sets itself up as the chronicler of the Soviet takeover - taking justifiable pride in a good job so far of reporting and documenting the process. The theory is advanced that the Soviets need Middle Eastern bases for the eventual takeover of Africa. Due note is taken of the enormous stake the U.S. has in Middle Eastern oil. Then, this statement, "In sum, for the Near East we foresee only increased requirements. Since there seems little likelihood of U.S. intervention of any sort in the area, these should be mainly in the

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2. WE Division

Operations in the DD/P are closely affected by the political ups and downs of various and assorted regimes, power groups, and individuals throughout the world. Planning for the future involves taking into account the contingencies which our intelligence information and analytical projections tell us are likely to occur.

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3. SR Division

There is an expanding Soviet presence in many areas of the world. This expansion on many fronts presents a particular challenge to CIA. SR Division, aware of the responsibilities to make both operational and staff contributions to the Agency's effort to meet the challenge, has requested an increase in staff of persons. The Division is quite aware of manpower and monetary restrictions which are designed to control wasteful activity, but this has not inhibited bold, forward planning on the part of SR Division.




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18 May 1965

Covert Action Staff

The Covert Action field is one in which the Agency currently finds both operational opportunity and difficult challenges. The Sino-Soviet rift has provided cracks in the Communist monolith which we have tried to widen. But on the other hand the Sino-Soviet competition in the under-developed areas has often caused the Soviets to try to out-do their more aggressive Chinese comrades and has presented CIA with a more diverse set of subversive fronts to try to counteract.



The planning question that occurs to us is whether CA Staff can continue devoting over [] of its budget to the Soviet Bloc given the importance of free world emerging countries. At McGeorge Bundy's request, CA Staff has developed a new proposal for a [] The CA Staff proposal is excellent and we support [] But why not five years ago? Why only after outside Agency prompting? And why not

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16 June 1965

I. The Purpose of the Group

A. The DCI has instructed me to have CIA prepare a long-term plan which will anticipate the scope and nature of future intelligence requirements and the programs necessary to meet these requirements, in order to focus this Agency and the Community on the essential jobs which lie ahead and to provide a basis for budget forecasts.

B. The DCI specified that this plan should cover a fifteen-year period (1966-1980) and be updated annually.

1. The first five years of the plan must be spelled out -- i.e. a year-by-year description of goals, programs to achieve goals and fairly precise outlines of money, manpower, R&D and hardware requirements.

2. The last ten years are to be covered in two five-year increments (1971-1975 and 1976-1980 -- these must of course be covered more generally) and should present the goals to be met and a very general description of programs required.

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C. Admiral Raborn has cautioned that long-term plans often result in wholesale additions of new and revised programs with little attention to the need for continuing or discontinuing existing programs. Therefore, in preparing this long-term plan, the group must also consider existing programs in their relation to future intelligence needs, and, to the extent possible, absorb the cost of proposed new programs through the discontinuance of existing low priority and marginally productive programs.

II. Terms of Reference

- A. At this point, and until further notice, the plan is to be a CIA Plan.
- B. Although the DCI wants very soon to place a plan before USIB, asking that it be used by the Community, it is obvious that he must first have an existing, fully tested planning system and an actual plan as a model. It is our job to develop a system and an actual plan for the DCI.
- C. The Outline for a Fifteen Year Plan, which has been furnished the group, was prepared by an ad hoc committee chaired by John Clarke. It has

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been reviewed by the DDCI and the DCI and approved in its general approach and concept.

B. You will note that the Outline before you contains three types of general guidance for the preparation of long-term goals and programs; i.e., Assumptions, Intelligence Objectives and Planning Guides -- these are now being subjected to a final review and should be in finished form in the next day or two. The three types of general guidance are:

1. Assumptions: a set of assumptions concerning the probable world situation over the next fifteen years;
2. Intelligence Objectives: a set of intelligence objectives describing general substantive requirements which must be met by intelligence in the foreseeable future; and,
3. Guides to Planning: a set of guides calling attention to important aspects of intelligence management, systems and methods which should

receive special consideration in the preparation of long-term goals and programs to meet objectives.

Note: While we believe that these three categories of guidance are now in completed form, and therefore need not receive intensive review by this group, it is recognized that your future deliberations may result in modification of the listings.

4. (Emphasize): The assumptions, objectives and planning guides are to be your basic guidance throughout this project -- however, it is not expected, nor is it feasible, that your forecasts of goals and programs be presented as direct, one-for-one responses to the various objectives and guides.

III. Materials and Other Support

A. The approach to this project is new to this Agency, but some work has already been carried out which will be of assistance. For example, we are already engaged in five-year budget forecasting and much of the work that

has gone into this is directly applicable to the job we have to do here under the first five years of the Fifteen Year Plan. Also, both the DD/P and DD/S&T already have project and program review systems.

B. HPAM, which will provide a full-time secretariat to this group, can provide materials and advice on budget program forecasting now being carried out by the Agency and can provide technical assistance in the preparation of any supporting materials which might be required.

C. Office space and a conference room is available for the group when and if we require it.

IV. Timing

A. We are to come up with a complete fifteen year forecast of CIA goals and programs for the DCI by September 1965. This gives us about ten to twelve weeks in which to work.

B. It is not my purpose to chart a specific course of action today -- you must first have an opportunity to study the outline which has been furnished you and review the revised guidance papers which have been mentioned

previously. Also, you will want time to think over how we should organize to accomplish the job before us. (For example, it may be desirable to establish working groups on particular aspects of the project -- e.g. by functional category such as production, collection, covert action, etc.)

C. We will meet again on Wednesday, 23 June, to begin work.

V. Request for views and reactions of members of the group

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks: The attached is an outline of how Mr. Kirkpatrick could present the Fifteen Year Plan to the new working group.

By the way:
DD/S has nominated: DD/I has nominated:

(Alternate)
Alternate)

DD/P has nominated:

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